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THE ART OF MEMORY AND
ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS
JEAN-PHILIPPE ANTOINE

A way to characterizie psychoanalytical cure would be to say
that it is an e n d e a v o u r to b r i n g back to consciousness a
m e m o r y — t h e m e m o r y w h o s e loss p r o m p t e d t h e v a r i o u s
symptoms of nervous disorders. T h u s it can well be defined as a
process of reminiscence. It is then rather surprising that Freud's
work, where memory constantly appears as a watermark, makes
so little of memory as a conceptual tool. Apart f r o m the specific
question of memory in dreams which is treated at the beginning
of The Interpretation of Dreams, the word rarely appears except as a
concession to common language, and remains exterior to the
analytical theory, though never far f r o m it. I would like in the
following pages to draw a comparison between two objects which
seem a priori very far away one f r o m the other: XlVth- and
XVth-century artes memoriae and Freud's researches on wit. I aim
to make clear how close Freud is to a theory of the workings of
memory as such, and why he nonetheless does not think in terms
of memory. At the same time, though, I do not intend this investigation to be a demonstration that the truth of artificial memory,
hidden to its mediaeval practitioners, lies in Freud's theories.
Rather, I would like to draw the parallels between the techniques
of the art of memory and the techniques analyzed by Freud as a
way to address not only the question of the logics of mnemonics
but, at least indirectly, that of psychoanalysis.
What is the art of memory? It is an ensemble of techniques
designed to improve or repair natural memory, and enable one to
r e m e m b e r better and more. We do not know when this art was
born, but it was certaintly practiced by the Romans of the classical
period, who left us the first texts precisely describing memory
techniques; we also have indirect evidence that, like many other
cultural items, these were inherited f r o m the Greeks. T h e ars
memoriae nearly fell into oblivion in Later Antiquity and the first
part of the Middle Ages, to be rediscovered d u r i n g the XI Ith and
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X H I t h centuries. This rediscovery took place mainly in Italy, at
the same time as the rise of the new civilian culture which
bloomed and reached its peak d u r i n g the X l V t h and XVth centuries. 1 T h e treatises that I investigate all belong to that period.
T h e art of memory relies on two sets of operations. T h e first
one is the building of a series of places, onto which images of the
things to be r e m e m b e r e d will be deposited. By mentally strolling
through the places, one is able to retrieve the images deposited
there. T h e building of the places obey certain rules, one of which
is that the places are usually conceived of as rooms in a house or
palace. They are not pure space but really places. I will briefly
r e t u r n at the end of these remarks to the question of space, but it
is a second set of rules which is my chief object of interest.
These are the rules devoted to the way of building images of the
memory objects to be deposited in the places. It may be provisionally described as a system of transformation of words into images.
At the outset, the memory object always belongs to language; it
may be a single word, or a g r o u p of words: a sentence or a whole
text. At the other end of the process, there are only images in a
series of rooms. O n e gets f r o m the first to the second by a manifold process of figuration, divided into two sets of operations: a)
the transformation of the original word or series of words into
visual material, t h r o u g h the use of a certain n u m b e r of figures; b)
the building of an imago agens, as it is called in latin, a moving
image: moving means both an image in movement and an image
that moves the mind of the person who sees it. Rules to this effect
are the following: when the memory object is a person, this
person or its substitute in the image must be involved in some
action, if possible violent, obscene or ridiculous, so as to be especially striking and thus better remembered; when the memory
object is an inanimate object, it must be put to use, if possible in a
unusual way, by a h u m a n figure. Consequently, every memory
image takes the form of apicture, a story involving not only objects
and places, but also, and always, h u m a n figures dealing with
them.
Maybe the best way to describe this process is to look at one of its
canonical examples, f o u n d in the Ad Herennium, a classical treatise
on rhetoric where the most complete antique treatment of artificial memory known to us is to be found, also the main source used
by mediaeval and Renaissance practitioners of the art, no doubt
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partly because of its attribution to Cicero, now known to be false.
This example is used by the author of the Ad Herennium to illustrate the mechanics of memory for words (memoria verborum), one
of the two parts of memory, the other being memory for things
(memoria rerum). As an example of memory for things, one may
quote Quintilian, who says that we can r e m e m b e r things having to
do with navigation by the image of an anchor, or warfare by that
of a weapon. 2 Memory for words, however, rather than memory
for things, is the depository of all the techniques of the art of
memory, and as such, it provides the best g r o u n d for examination.
T h e example given in the Ad Herennium is the memorization of
a verse: lam domum itionem reges Atridae parant, whose English
translation reads: And now their homecoming the kings, the sons of
Atreus are making ready.3 First, the verse is divided in two parts,
each of them allocated to a different place. T h e image for the first
part of the verse is the following: "Domitius raising his hands to
heaven while he is lashed by the Marcii Reges" (in latin: manus ad caelum
tollentem Domitium cum a regibus marciis loris caedatur). T h e word iam
(now) does not appear in the image, but the rest of it deals
effectively with representing the words: according to the rules of
scansion domum itionem has to be pronounced dom'itionem, which
sounds very much like domitium. Reges remains, but it is specified:
the marcii reges allude to an illustrious patrician family, the family
of Marcius Rex, opposed to the Domitian family, as illustrious but
of plebeian extraction. T h e image is that of "some street scene in
which Domitius . . . is being beaten u p by some members of the
distinguished Marcian family." 4
T h e second part of the verse (Atridae parant) is memorized
somewhat differently, by imagining "Aesopus and Cimber (two
well-known actors of the time) being dressedfor the roles of Agamemnon and Menelaus in Iphigenia. " 5 These two images have been built
using a n u m b e r of rules: first a pun, a play on words; then, in the
case of the Domitian and Marcian families as well as in the case of
the actors, a rule that recommends that to impersonate the figures we need to r e m e m b e r , we use persons known to us. Finally,
the beating of Domitian by the Rex is the literal application of the
rule requiring memory images to be as striking as possible, here
through the use of violence.
With the second part of the verse, a different kind of play with
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words is at hands: whereas the pun's pivot was the assonance
between dom'itionem and domitium, this time the play is with the
multiple sense of parant. T h e figuring of atridae by the actors is
both a case of using persons known to us to impersonate others—
in fact using actors h e r e m e a n s using the very f i g u r e of
impersonation—and a case of verbal specification: atridae and
reges both are the very words used in the original text and,
t h r o u g h their second meaning, become a different element, producing a new visual scene.
Many of the traditional rhetorical figures appear in this example. As a matter of fact, if given a series of examples, more or less
the whole catalogue of tropes recognized by classical rhetoric will
show up: irony, allusion, synecdoche, metaphor, etc. But, as the
verse we just read may have already p r e p a r e d us to think, the
rhetoric of the art of memory is somewhat different f r o m normal
rhetoric. It ignores its usual boundaries, in two ways: a) it uses
figures with a greater density than everyday language or even
literature: the proliferation of figures in memory images is extreme and somewhat anomalous, as the memorization of the
verse suffices to demonstrate, b) the range of the figures in use is
wider. T h e art of memory accepts as valid elements for the building of images, materials that would be rejected f r o m other types
of language because of their absurdity, low taste or lack of relevance. O n e could say that whereas in the normal use of rhetoric
figures are subordinated to their enhancing the original meaning, in the art of memory the figuration process goes wild. T h e
requirement that the figure be meaningful—as for instance in the
anchor for navigation example—is most often d r o p p e d , and replaced by a curious delight—some would say complacency—for
mere play with the sound of words.
T o use Saussure's well-known categories, in the first case the
signified is p r e p o n d e r a n t over the signifier, but in the latter the
signifier is p r e p o n d e r a n t over the signified. In this respect, the
figuration process used by the art of memory does not resemble
so much literary or oratorical rhetorics as it resembles a lower
kind of literature or speech: puns, jokes, charades, i.e. all the
manifestations of wit. T h e r e figures are used not for the purpose
of persuasion, but apparently for the sole purpose of playing with
words and ideas. We may therefore be dealing here with two
expressions of a same technique of the mind. In both cases we
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find the same f r e e d o m in the use of figures, the same attachment
to the letter of a text rather than its meaning, and the same lack of
literary value. Many memory treatises are anonymous, as are
most of the jokes we are told; both categories belong to the
"cheaper stuff," and the question of their artistic value is irrelevant.
Now, if the mental process that constitutes artificial memory
has not been thoroughly investigated—with the exception of a
book by brain scientist A. Luriia about a contemporary Russian
mnemonist whose self-taught techniques strangely resemble the
ancient and mediaeval techniques 6 —this is not the case with puns
and jokes. T h e i r analysis is the core of one of Freud's most
undervalued works, although it is in many ways one of the most
beautiful: Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious, or, as it has been
more recently mistranslated, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious.171 shall f r o m now on attempt to see how Freud's analysis of
wit can be of help to describe and understand the mechanics of
artificial memory.
Freud's work is divided in three parts: the first one is a semantic
analysis of jokes and puns, which enables him to define several
types of operations at work in their building. It is especially
relevant here since these categories can serve to define memory
techniques in a coherent way, whereas the memory treatises
themselves provide us with very disparate modes of classification.
T h e two other parts of the book—synthetic and theoretic—are
devoted to exploring the hidden logic of wit.
In the first part, Freud divides his material into two areas: play
with words—puns and calembours (wortwitze)—and play with
thoughts, which do not involve necessarily puns, but work to
displace ideas and significance through different types of association (gedankenwitze). We f o u n d a similar distinction in the art of
memory: the one between memory for words, where every word,
and therefore every sound, is to be stocked in memory, and
memory for things, where a whole matter or story is first reduced
to certain keywords before it is committed to memory and where
association between ideas—gedankenwitze—is the first step required.
Freud begins by showing how the area of play with words,
which appears at first as a haphazard multiplicity of figures, can
be reduced to two operations: condensation and unification. T h e
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first example given of condensation is the following: "In the part
of the Reisebilder entitled " T h e baths of Lucca," Heine introduces
the delightful figure of the lottery-agent and extractor of courns
Hirsch-Hyacinth of H a m b u r g , who boasts to Heine of his relations with the wealthy Baron Rothschild, and finally says: "And,
as true as God shall grant me all good things, Doctor, I sat beside
Salomon Rothschild and he treated me quite as his equal—quite
famillionairely. "8
T h e thought expressed here is not particularly funny: what is
signaled is the impossibility for the millionaire to really treat a
poor man as his equal. T h e wit therefore resides in the neologism
famillionaire substituted to the implicit thought: he treated me
(only) as familiarly as a millionaire can a poorer man. " T h e newly
constructed word concides, in its earlier portion with the familiar
of the first [thought], and its final syllables with the millionaire of
the [implicit thought]. It stands, as it were, for the whole second
[thought], and so puts us in a position to infer the second sentence
that has been omitted in the text of the joke." 9 T h e joke-technique
"might be described as condensation accompanied by theformation of a
substitute.",0 Everybody familiar with Lewis Carroll's tales and
poems will recognize here what Carroll calls a.portmanteau, i.e., a
formation where, to put it into Humpty Dumpty's words, "there
are two meanings packed into one word.1
Condensation, though, is not limited to the construction of a
new word f r o m two others. Freud goes on to another example:
" T h e voice of Europe once made the cruel joke of changing a
potentate's name f r o m Leopold to Cleopold, on account of the
relations he had at one time with a lady with the first name of
Cleo. This undoubted product of condensation keeps alive an
annoying allusion at the cost of a single letter." 12 Freud remarks
here, by the way, that p r o p e r names are especially subject to that
treatment. Indeed: they either do not have any meaning or have
lost it. Here it is t h r o u g h the addition of an element to the original
word that the condensation process is achieved. A comparable
example can be f o u n d in the Ad Herennium, where the word testis
(witness) is represented by the image of goat's testicles (testiculi).13
O t h e r examples work t h r o u g h subtraction of an element: thus
with a memory treatise where the word cereales (cereals) is remembered through its transformation in the image of pieces of
wax(cerae) provided with wings (alae). If one takes into account
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not the original spelling—the spelling of a word can vary in the
same text—but its sound, one notices the suppression of the 5 at
the end of the word. 1 4 In each case, the modification of part of the
original word or text is the means of its association with a new
word or image carrying the second thought or memory.
O n e might stress here an understated but important law governing those figures. T o be funny or striking, the condensation
has to be as spare as possible, and the smaller the modification, the
better it works. Cleopold is better than famillionaire; cerae/alae is
better than testiculi. T h u s a frugal ideal of economy seems to be at
work in the process, an ideal even better embodied in the second
type of operation recorded by Freud: the multiple use of the same
material, or unification, where "a [word] is used twice, once as a
whole and again divided u p into its separate syllables, which,
when they are thus separated, give another sense." 15
This technique is to be f o u n d u n d e r different disguises: the
repeated unit can be a whole word, without any modification,
even of spelling, as in the following example: "Louis XV wanted
to test the wit of one of his courtiers, of whose talent he had been
told. At the first opportunity he c o m m a n d e d the gentleman to
make a joke of which he, the king, should be the subject. T h e
courtier at once made the clever reply: ' T h e king is not a subject'." 1 6 T h e unification of the two meanings of subject—topic and
person subjected to the sovereign—is the basis for this witty
answer. A similar type of operation was at work in the memorization of the verse in the Ad Herennium: lam domum itionem reges
Atridae parant. T h e r e reges means, without modification, both
kings and the name of a family, and parant refers both to the
preparation of the return trip of the Atrides and to the preparation of the actors before the stage.
T h e repeated unit can also be the aural image of the word, as in
a second example provided by Freud: "A young man was introduced into a Paris salon, who was a relative of the great JeanJacques Rousseau and bore his name. Moreover he was redhaired. But he behaved so awkwardly that the hostess remarked
critically to the gentleman who had introduced him: "Vous
m'avez fait connaitre un j e u n e h o m m e roux etsot, mais non pas un
Rousseau." [You have made me acquainted with a young man who
is red-haired and silly, but not a Rousseau]. 17 This process of
unification is also to be f o u n d in adulterated form, as in the Italian
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expression Traduttore, traditore! (Translator, traitor!). 18 T h e r e a
slight modification is necessary to produce the wit. Even though
unification in this example resembles very much condensation, it
remains different, in that the new thought expressed through the
wit does not remain hidden. It does not need any reduction to
become explicit.
Parallel to these plays with words, the wit and the art of memory
play with ideas, operating not on the signifier but displacing the
signified. I will mention only three examples, since once more the
figures used are part of the traditional catalogue of rhetorical
tropes. Juxtaposition is the first one. Just as double
double
entendre) is the most economical mode of unification when dealing
with words, juxtaposition is the most economical mode of unification when dealing with thoughts. Unifying two heterogeneous
objects or concepts, or one object and a concept, by the conjunction and is a way to make them f u n n y or striking. 19 This is important, notwithstanding its banality, since a) it is the most basic link
between two words or things: it does not presuppose any meaningful liaison between them other than the will to put them
together; and b) it is also the means by which both places and
images are organized in artificial memory: images and places are
set beside each other, and that is the one and only principle or
order, whatever the nature of the memory object: abstract, concrete, big, small, etc. Here too, then, economy seems to be the
guiding principle.
T h e mention of places and images is an invitation to go back to a
figure alluded to before, an important one since it organizes every
image: the rule that calls for images to be striking. This can be
achieved, according to the Ad Herennium, "if we assign to them
exceptional beauty or singular ugliness; if we dress some of them
with crowns or purple cloaks, for example, so that the likeness
may be more distinct to us; or if we somehow disfigure them, as by
introducing one stained with blood or soiled with m u d or
smeared with red paint, so that its form is more striking, or by
assigning certain comic effects to o u r images, for that too will
ensure o u r r e m e m b e r i n g them more readily." 20 O n e cannot but
recognize here hyperbole (overstatement), a cherished instrument
of jokes as well as of rhetoric.
I should also mention that representation by opposites (irony) is
both cited by memory treatises and by Freud in his analysis.
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Sometimes the opposition is neutral, as when one uses black to
signify white, sometimes it is charged with underlying criticism, as
in this Freudian example, again taken f r o m Heine: "This lady
resembles the Venus of Milo in many respects: she, too, is extraordinarily old, like her she has no teeth, and there are white
patches on the yellowish surface of her body." 2 1 T h e Venus of
Milo, the very ideal of classical feminine beauty for the XlXth
century, is thus presented in ways that signify the very opposite of
beauty.
Let us call an end to this enumeration and reflect on the
preceding figures. All of them point to a feature common to wit
and the art of memory: the preference for extraneous modes of
association, such as simultaneity, spatial contiguity, assonance, as
opposed to intrinsic modes such as causality, resemblance, etc; the
preference for accident as opposed to meaningful relations. All of
them also have in common a striking tendency towards economy
of means, all the more striking since this tendency, easily recognizable in the particular figures, pertains to a project which, in
general, can be characterized as excessively spendthrift.
Indeed, now that we have described in sufficient detail the
operations common to wit and the art of memory, it may be time
to ask a question about artificial memory that the reader of this
article may already have been silently entertaining for a while:
what is the use of these transpositions? Has something really been
gained? If so, what is it? Is the price paid for that gain worth the
effort?
These are legitimate questions. Even the best historian of the
art of memory, Frances Yates, whose interest and fervor are
unquestionable, cannot refrain f r o m writing: "there were inert or
lazy or unskilled people in Cicero's time who took the common sense view to
which, personally I heartily subscribe—as I explained earlier I am a
historian only of the art, not a practitioner of it—that all these places and
images would only bury under a heap of rubble whatever little one does
remember naturally. " 22 These considerations may lead us to believe
that the art of memory is a curiosity, the grotesque fruit of
mediaeval scholars' minds, and deserves to be studied only as
such. This cannot account for the wide use and cultural significance of memory techniques f r o m the X H I t h to the XVth century
unless we think that the practitioners of these methods were
equivalent to the primitives of late XlXth-century anthropology.
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We would have to presuppose a kind of mentalit'eprimitive, foreign
to us moderns, that we are entitled to decipher, being more
rational than the people we study. T h u s Yates' otherwise admirable study oscillates between the recognition of ars memoriae as a
cultural configuration informing and shaping the thinking of a
period but somewhat offensive to common sense—which implies
some intellectual perversity on the part of its users—and its reduction to games played by clerks and scholars which, notwithstanding their interest for the study of intellectual history, do
not have much validity in themselves; but why then, did such a
"curiosity" enjoy such success, most of all in humanist Italy?
T h e second possible hypothesis is that there is a "hidden"
economy of artificial memory, which it is difficult for us to perceive today, since with very few and culturally insignificant exceptions, this art has not been practiced for three or four centuries.
Could it be that the extensive a m o u n t of work required to put it to
use is somehow worth the effort? T o answer this question, it is not
enough to identify the figures at work in the process; their
dynamics must also be understood. This means leaving the field
of semantic analysis to take into account the psychological forces
figures are invested with. And this is where Freud's analysis once
again becomes relevant. In dealing with the "tendency to economy" characterizing figures in wit, Freud finds himself confronted with the very problem posed by memory images:
T h e economies made by the joke-technique do not greatly impress us.
They may remind us, perhaps, of the way in which some housewives
economize when they spend time a n d money on a journey to a distant
market because vegetables are to be had a few farthings cheaper. What
does a joke save by its technique? T h e putting together of a few new
words, which would mostly have emerged without any trouble. Instead
of that, it has to take the trouble to search out the one word which covers
the two thoughts. Indeed, it must often first transform one of the
thoughts into an unusual f o r m which will provide a basis for its combination with the second thought. Would it not have been simpler, easier,
and, in fact, more economical to have expressed the two thoughts as they
happened to come, even if this involved no common form of expression?
Is not the economy in words uttered more than balanced by the expenditure on intellectual effort? And who saves by that? Who gains by it? 23

T o answer his question, Freud noted the element of play common in jokes, a feature it shares with the figures of the art of
memory: "Play appears in children while they are learning to
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make use of words and put thoughts together. . . . In doing so,
they come across pleasurable effects, which arise f r o m a repetition of what is similar, a rediscovery of what is familiar, similarity
of sound, etc., and which are to be explained as unsuspected
economies in physical expenditure." 2 4 This first stage of activity is
brought to an end by the gradual strengthening of "the critical
faculty or reasonableness." Play becomes "meaningless or actually absurd" and cannot take place without the consciousness of doing
something forbidden by reason as well as social rules. T h e pleasure derived f r o m it cannot be revived, except when, u n d e r
special circumstances, the critical inhibition can be lifted. O n e way
that we find o u r way back to the original pleasure of play with
words is through jests and jokes, for they are used to carry a
meaningful thought, and thus are legitimate. " T h e joke-work . . .
shows itself in a choice of verbal material and conceptual situations which will allow the old play with words and thoughts to
withstand the scrutiny of criticism; and with that end in view every
peculiarity of vocabulary and every combination of thoughtsequences must be exploited in the most ingenious possible
way." 25 T h e techniques of jokes are therefore really "the sources
from which jokes provide pleasure, and we feel that there is nothing
strange in other procedures drawing from the same sources for the same
end."26 What Freud demonstrates here for jokes constitutes a
valid analysis of all kinds of figures: any language making a large
use of figures—be it poetry, literature or jokes—attempts to get
access to the usually forbidden activity of play with words, here
validated through the expression of serious or meaningful content. This is true even when, as is most often the case, the figures
are "innocent," when they seem to function as ornaments which
do not add any meaning to the thought expressed. A high rate of
figures, in any given language, is a way of retrieving the childish
pleasure of play and a form of protest against the constraints of
reason, whatever the content of the figure. Wit and the art of
memory, with their overexposed use of figures, lay bare one of
the psychic logics of all figures.
T h e examples that we have given above, however, have one
thing in common: their lack of innocence, or, to put it in Freud's
own terms, their purpose. Play cannot entirely account for the
pleasure they a f f o r d . We have to look f u r t h e r at the content they
express.
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Taking a second look at them, we will find that what has been
added by the figure is a "second thought" that cannnot be expressed openly, an affect that cannot be vented without disguise.
It is obviously the case with the first examples we gave: famillionaire and Cleopold. In the first, Hyacinth expresses resentment
in response to the condescending attitude of Rothschild, at the
same time that he boasts about his intimacy with him. In the
second there is a sexual innuendo. T h e king's social position makes
a direct assertion of what is only implied in the joke very difficult.
T h e Rousseau anecdote also expresses a latent hostility, as does
the remark involving the Venus of Milo. In the first case, the
hostess expresses her resentment at the guest who introduced
such a silly man to her, while still clinging to an etiquette of good
breeding. In the second, the wording of a comparison supposedly
elaborated to praise beauty is made to express the author's strong
disgust. In economical terms, these jokes are shorter than would
the two thoughts they involve, if both thoughts were expressed in
their entirety. We know, however, that they cannot be. T h e second thought has to remain implicit, or rather expressed indirectly. Thus, the need for restraint gives use to the "economy" so
characteristic of wit.
From this, memory images can be better understood. T h e use
of transpositions to build images appears to be a long and wasteful
detour f r o m the operations of plain, natural memory. Memory
images, however, are not longer. They are shorter. They are in
reality an economical way of expressing thoughts that cannot be
expressed openly. Even when the rules do not explicitly require it,
the examples o f f e r e d by manuals of the art of memory all have a
purpose, and that purpose is either hostility or obscenity. I shall cite
but a few samples f r o m the plentiful material available.
T h e idea of joining affects to images is f o u n d in the rule that
requires images to be moving and that h u m a n figures be part of
every image. It is r e c o m m e n d e d we use "somebody whom we know,
whether as afriend or as an enemy, who will be standing and doing, in this
place something ridiculous or unusual, or saving such a thing: for
instance, that a Peter (the name here to be remembered) be in the first
place, who would kill a man that you know; or who would threaten with his
naked sword; or still who would eat or drink something extravagant,"27
T h e choice of a friend or an enemy is a first intimation of the lack
of neutrality of the supporting image which is required. It is only
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when we put these figures together with the techniques used to
make them striking that the underlying pattern, however, comes
to light. When the imago agens is that of somebody about whom I
feel positively, then either he or she is the a u t h o r of a violent or
ridiculous act, (a fantasy which clearly exhibits latent feelings of
hostility) or he or she is the victim (and here too one can identify
hostility). When we think of someone we know as an enemy, his or
her representation as a m u r d e r e r or a bully clearly serves to
embody hostile feelings.
All the structural possibilities then point in a single direction:
the expression of hostility. (There is even more hostility when we
use irony as a memory device, as when the image of a righteous
person we know is linked to "shameful and dirty deeds," or when a
low character is given an image full of dignity and honor. In this
case, a kind of cynicism which is a veiled critique of society and its
hypocrisy is a d d e d to the expression of hostile feelings towards an
individual.)
Hostility and aggressivity are built in the most general rules
governing the formation of images. This is usually not the case
with the other important initial underlying memory images, the
expression of obscene thoughts or sexual desire. O n e exception is
f o u n d in a treatise by one of the most illustrious "memory doctors" of the late XVth century, Peter of Ravenna, who advises his
reader to use "most beautiful lasses" as supporting images. "You
know now a secret most useful to memory, a secret I long had to keep for
myself because of modesty: ifyou wish to remember swiftly, put in the places
the most beautiful virgins."2* This advice, although not f o u n d in
such general f o r m elsewhere, is put to use in other treatises, such
as Leonardo Giustiniani's, where the city of Venice is made to
resemble "ayoung virgin known to me."29 (This is, by the way, a clear
indication of the necessity which lies behind the female allegories
of the paintings of that time.)
Most of the sexual purposes, revealed by the manuals, however,
have less to do with the expression of adult male desire than with
the expression of childish obscenities. Obscene images are not
identified as such in the rules, but they are to be f o u n d u n d e r the
heading of ridiculous, extravagant or shameful attitudes. T h u s
the image of m u r d e r and threat that I mentioned earlier is immediately followed by another example of a "ridiculous or unusual
act," "John stood in a tavern, and peed or exposed his pudenda. " 3 0 T h e
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image of a man peeing (often on the image of what is to be
remembered) or exposing himself is frequently found in the
explanation of the most general rules governing the formation of
images, as here, or in examples where a verbal transposition is
used. T h e assonance between the word or g r o u p of words to be
r e m e m b e r e d and another associated with sexual matters provides
the material out of which the image is built. In another example,
the object of memory is an Italian surname: Gallochino di Bollabecha. T h e final image for it is a rooster bent on a man, pecking
his testicles, which can be accounted for by the so puns: rooster is
gallo (unification); thisgallo is chinato, bent on a m a n (condensation by addition); it is pecking, becca (unification again) the balls,
bolla, (unification once more). 3 1
What is most notable in these images is the infantile character of
their sexuality. T h e insistence on exhibitionism and excrements
suggests that "mnemonic obscenity" is a special instance of a more
general tendency: the tendency to return to "the stage of childhood,
so as once more to gain possession of the childish source ofpleasure" and in
so doing make use of the unconscious, "for the infantile is the
source of the unconscious, a n d the unconscious t h o u g h t processes are none other than those—the one and only ones—
produced d u r i n g early childhood." 3 2
Wit and artificial memory use the same techniques—rhetorical
figures—with the same unusual degree of freedom, which we
have traced to the desire to go back to a childish play with language and to the compromises required if it is to be allowed
satisfaction. Both are loaded with the expression of hostile and
obscene thoughts, which are not allowed to be freely thought or
spoken. T h e same resources, in fact, are put to work by both wit
and artificial memory.
T h e ways they are put to work are, however, very different. Of
these differences, three are striking. Wit is intended to yield
laughter, and often does, whereas memory images are not funny,
even though they rely u p o n the same techniques. Wit is directed
to another ("The psychical process of constructing a joke seems
not to be completed when the joke occurs to one: something
remains over which seeks, by communicating the idea, to bring
the unknown process of constructing the joke to a conclusion." 3 3
Memory images are quite unlike this, for they are explicitly intended for one's own use. T h e ones we read about exist only

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol18/iss18/2

14

Antione: The Art of Memory and its Relation to the Unconscious
15

as examples of an otherwise wholly private and self-addressed
process.
These differences are not accessory. T h r o u g h them it is possible to understand the particular working dynamics of the art of
memory, as we shall now see. What is at stake in the presence or
absence of an addressee, or of laughter? Answering this question
requires a f u r t h e r look at the conditions that provoke laughter.
First, a "third person" is necessary. Second, to be effective, a j o k e
has to be g r o u n d e d in a context shared both by the addresser and
the addressee. Context here has a factual meaning. T h e addressee
must know the circumstances underlying the joke or pun. T h e
n u m b e r of jokes that have current or recent events as their subject
illustrates this point. Context also has a psychological meaning,
somehow even more important than the factual meaning: addresser and addressee must partake of the same culture and
inhibitions, otherwise they will not laugh. 3 4
This feature is the key to the understanding of the addressee's
reaction: "He must be able as a matter of habit to erect in himself
the same inhibition which the first person's joke has overcome, so
that, as soon as he hears the joke, the readiness for this inhibition
will compulsively or automatically awaken. This readiness for
inhibition, which I must recognize as a real expenditure, analogous to mobilization in military affairs, will at the same moment
be recognized as superfluous or too late, and so be discharged in
statu nascendi by laughter." 3 5 Thus, whereas the addresser has had
to work to produce the joke, the addressee "has bought the
pleasure of the joke with very small expenditure on his own part.
He might be said to have been presented with it." 36 T h e possibility
of laughter is linked to the absence of effort, or more precisely to
the realization that the energy mobilized can be freely discharged.
This first laugh, once released, releases in turn the addresser's
laughter: his effort having attained its goal, does not need to be
sustained any longer, and is discharged in laughter too.
We can see now the role played by the addressee in the jokeprocess, and what is the function of laughter in its economy. Let
us turn now to memory images, to see why they are not f u n n y , and
how they work.
Two moments can be distinguished in the operations of artificial memory: a) the building of the image, and its allocation to a
place; b) its recollection, and t h r o u g h it the recollection of the
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memory object. In the first stage, the author of the image is both
addresser and addressee. As the addresser, he is spared none of
the expense associated with the use of figures; therefore he
cannot laugh. Moreover, addresser and addressee being one, he,
as the addressee, knows all the workings of the joke; he is in the
position of someone to whom a j o k e would be explained as it is
unfolded—certainly the best way to kill laughter. Finally, because
of the absence of external addressee, the psychic expenditure
attached to the figures cannot be discharged, and remains suspended.
It is this suspended energy whch is used in the second stage—
the act of recollection—when the reading of the image brings
forth the memory object associated with it. T h e author of the
image retrieves the image, not as a construction of figures needing to be read one after the other as a text, but as an immediate
presence, a vision given as a whole; one then occupies the position
of the addressee, who is spared the work of building the image,
and therefore can release the spared psychic energy. But, in
contrast to the joke process, where the energy thus released is
discharged in laughter, in the memory process it is immediately
reemployed in reading the image: seeing it, one retrieves the memory
object encapsulated in the figures. O n e does not laugh because
one remembers.
Finally, while the play of wit may evoke images, its aim wholly
pertains to language, to an alliance between significance and
sound. T h e aim of artificial memory, however, is an image, a visual
product like another product of the mind which is self-addressed:
the dream.
Freud's theory of dreams is today familiar to everybody. T h e
dream "appears as a mesh-work of sense-impressions, mostly
visual but also of other kinds, the illusion of an event, with which
thought-processes and expressions of affect may be mingled."
This memory of the dream, which is often "entirely absurd and
confused," Freud calls "the dream's manifest content." But this
"strange manifest content can regularly be made intelligible as a
mutilated and altered transcript of certain rational psychical
structures which deserve the name of latent dream-thoughts. . . In
the case of adults, it seems to be a generally binding condition that
the [thought] which creates the d r e a m shall be one which is alien
to conscious thinking—a repressed wish—or will possibly at least
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have reinforcements that are unknown to consciousness. . . T h e
action of this unconscious wish u p o n the consciously rational
material of the dream-thoughts produces the dream." 3 7 T h e
d r e a m is therefore the disguised expression of an unconscious
thought, which can be retrieved by identification of the figures
used to disguise it, just as the retrieval of the memory image
enables one to recall what is to be remembered.
T h e thought-process governing dream-work is in other respects also similar to the techniques of the art of memory. It has
high density of figures, even higher than memory images. Furthermore, they are the same figures p r e f e r r e d by the manuals of
artificial memory: the dream, too, replaces "internal associations
(similarity, causal connection, etc.) by what are known as external
ones (simultaneity, contiguity in space, assonance)." 3 8 O u r memory of dreams is that of a continuous present, which replaces all
tenses and modes. This perception accounts for the difficulty,
when we wake up, of telling what h a p p e n e d in o u r d r e a m in its
chronological o r d e r . O u r recall is like a series of pictures set side
by side. Memory images achieve the same result. When they have
been built, every element relating to time has disappeared, to be
converted in spatial relations: each image is set in a place, and
places are set one beside the other. It would appear that the
suppression of time and causal connection is a chief aim of artificial memory.
In some ways, then, the art of memory is closer to dream-work
than it is to the techniques of wit. In other respects, it is closer to
wit. And in one significant dimension, it is unlike both. T h e
energy, which in wit is discharged in laughter, and in dreams is
used to express hidden thoughts without letting them be consciously acknowledged, is there mobilized to "charge" the memory object, through the use of figures, with affects, giving its
image the power of dreams. Artificial memory appears therefore
as an original attempt to domesticate energies that are usually
ignored, when not feared or denied. This domestication of the
Unconscious may be looked at in different ways. Whereas Freud's
work emphasizes the necessity of the analyst's work as the only
way to gain access to the real meaning of the figures used by the
Unconscious, the art of memory speaks a different language. It is
not so much interested in interpretation as in putting the figures
to practical use, thus making a conscious use of preconscious
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material; the control and expansion of memory replace interpretation, one wonders with what consequences on the economics of
the soul.
For by channelling preconscious material into images and putting them to work, isn't artificial memory trying to tame the
untamable? It is perpetually threatened by two equally destructive extremes: a process of figuration bursting out of control,
unable to p e r f o r m the minimum task of self-communication, and
eventually leading to psychosis; E. Kris sees such a case in the
person of Opicinus de Castris, an early XlVth century clerk
whose mnemonic devices are based on the techniques we described, and are one of the few evidences of medieval memory
drawings: these drawings, along with the text they f r a m e allude to
a personal history filled with depressive episodes, and they may
be seen as both an expression of these episodes and a failed
attempt at curing himself. 39 Another extreme is the tight and
repressive control of the material used in the building of figures,
which, by paying excessive dues to decency and normal social
communication, uses images too bland to build any psychic tension and fuel the memorizing process. T h e fragile balance between these two extremes does not d e p e n d only on individual
work, but more probably on cultural and social conditions such as
can be f o u n d in the centuries when the treatises flourish, and such
as cannot be artifically recreated today.
Thus, if the art of memory is not a mere antiquarian's curio and
deserves to be studied on its own ground, the balance between
what it has to say about the economics of the soul and what
belongs to a particular episode in cultural history is a delicate one.
Freud's work on wit would have m a d e of him a prime candidate to
this study and one cannot but d r e a m of his encounter with the ars
memoriae manuscripts lying in his beloved Padua, Florence and
Rome. T h a t this d r e a m cannot be realized should not prevent
others f r o m taking on the task.
New York University
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